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LETTING THE ELECTRICS SLIDE:
A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO STATE
DEALER-FRANCHISE LAWS PROHIBITING
DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER CAR SALES
Thomas Sperber*
Tesla Motors has a business model for its U.S. sales unlike that of all other
car manufacturers: Tesla sells cars directly to consumers rather than
through a system of independently owned dealers. Most car manufacturers
choose not to sell cars this way because most states have dealer laws that
ban direct-to-consumer sales. To use this business model, Tesla has had to
win narrow exceptions to these dealer franchise laws. It has mostly
succeeded with this method and can now sell cars, albeit from a limited
number of company stores, in all but six states.
Tesla is now suing the state of Michigan claiming that its dealer franchise
law violates Tesla’s rights to substantive due process and equal protection.
Traditionally, economic regulations facing Fourteenth Amendment
challenges are subject only to a low standard of scrutiny that grants great
deference to legislative judgment. However, some lower courts have been
applying a standard of scrutiny that, while still low, requires some inquiry
into the legitimacy of the legislature’s justifications of the regulation.
This Note argues that, if Tesla’s case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Court should institute a more exacting standard of review for economic
regulations that discriminate against one party for the sole purpose of
protecting the economic interests of another. The extremely deferential
reaction to cases such as Lochner v. New York, where the right of parties to
contract was upheld against all better judgments, has no place in a political
system where big money interests can influence state legislatures. To be
clear, this Note does not ask the Court to carve out an exception for Tesla
but rather to strike down the universal ban on direct-to-consumer car sales.
This Note embarks on a thorough review of the Court’s application of
substantive due process, a study of the current regulatory climate of new car
sales, and a recommendation that the Court should consider the compelling
policy reasons to rule in favor of Tesla.

* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2014, State University of
New York at Binghamton. I would like to thank Professor Andrew Kent and the editors and
staff of the Fordham Law Review for their guidance and assistance throughout this process. I
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INTRODUCTION
A Texan who wants to buy a car from the electric automobile manufacturer
Tesla accesses Tesla’s website to locate the nearest Tesla “gallery” in his
state. He finds that there are eight galleries to choose from in Texas1 and
drives to the nearest one. When he arrives, he is greeted by an employee who
shows him the various models that Tesla sells. The employee shows the
Texan a car he likes, prompting him to ask to test-drive it. Much to the
Texan’s surprise, the employee says no. Regardless, the Texan is so smitten
with the car that he tells the employee he would like to order one anyway, as
long as the price is reasonable. The employee explains that not only is he
forbidden from taking orders, he cannot even discuss the price of the car.2
Although the Texan’s experience sounds like something from a comedy
sketch, it is a scenario not unlike those experienced by any resident of Texas,
Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan, Utah, or West Virginia, where direct sales
of automobiles are banned.3 In these states, a customer must buy a car from
an independently owned dealer franchise. This is incongruent with Tesla’s
business model. Tesla employs a system of company-owned stores and

1. See US Tesla Stores and Galleries, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/findus/list/stores/
United+States [https://perma.cc/7DSR-25RZ] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
2. See Peter Valdes-Dapena, Tesla’s Fight with America’s Car Dealers, CNN (May 20,
2013,
3:04
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/20/autos/telsa-car-dealers
[https://perma.cc/H46B-WNXS].
3. Mike Ramsey, Tesla Weighs New Challenge to State Direct-Sales Bans, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/tesla-weighs-new-challenge-to-state-directsales-bans-1459189069 [https://perma.cc/MB7W-26JQ].
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outlets from which people buy cars directly.4 Thus, in states where this
practice is banned, Tesla can only direct potential customers to its website or
a neighboring state’s sales department.
Bans of direct-to-consumer sales of automobiles have their fans and
detractors. The National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA), for
instance, argues that consumers benefit from the support that independent
dealers can provide beyond the actual sale of the car and from the competition
between dealers themselves and the multiple car brands that a given dealer
sells.5 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) argues that the independentdealer distribution model actually leads to higher car prices with negligible
consumer benefit.6 Whether states are on solid constitutional footing with
these statutes could hinge on whose argument is supported by the evidence.
Tesla has succeeded in challenging some of these laws by compromising
with dealer associations and legislators. These compromises allow car
manufacturers like Tesla to operate limited numbers of direct-sale stores.7
Willingness to negotiate, however, has not proved to be a comprehensive
solution. For example, a bill in Texas, much like those passed in states that
carved out exceptions for companies like Tesla, never made it to a vote once
the state legislature caved to pressure from dealer associations.8 Until now,
Tesla has only challenged these laws on a state-by-state basis.
In March 2016, the Wall Street Journal reported that Tesla General
Counsel Todd Maron was considering a constitutional challenge to these
laws.9 His team had been studying St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille,10 a Fifth
Circuit decision that struck down a Louisiana statute requiring licensing of
coffin manufacturers.11 Some scholars see this case as a possible indicator
that federal courts may be abandoning the post-Lochner deference given to a
state legislature when a statute is challenged for violating a plaintiff’s
economic rights.12 Then, on September 22, 2016, John Bursch, on behalf of
4. Daniel A. Crane, Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, and the Politics of Crony Capitalism,
101 IOWA L. REV. 573, 580 (2016).
5. MARYANN KELLER & KENNETH ELIAS, CONSUMER BENEFITS OF THE DEALER
FRANCHISE SYSTEM 2 (2014), https://www.nada.org/workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?
id=21474838844 [https://perma.cc/XZP6-VB86].
6. U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opinion Letter on Proposed Michigan Senate Bill 268 (May
7,
2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staffcomment-regarding-michigan-senate-bill-268-which-would-create-limited-exceptioncurrent/150511michiganautocycle.pdf [https://perma.cc/TF4J-YBEZ].
7. See Crane, supra note 4, at 584 (“In a number of states, Tesla and the car dealers have
reached agreements on compromise legislation allowing Tesla a fixed number of stores in the
state: New Jersey (four dealerships), Ohio (three dealerships), and Pennsylvania (five
dealerships).”).
8. Dylan Baddour, Tesla v. Texas Dealerships Explained: Are More Luxury Electric
Cars
Headed
Our
Way?,
HOUS.
CHRON.
(May
23,
2016),
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/local/explainer/article/texas-law-tesla-franchisedealership-electric-cars-7940158.php [https://perma.cc/PCG9-Q44X].
9. Ramsey, supra note 3.
10. 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013).
11. Id. at 217.
12. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 527, 577–78 (2015) (“At the very least, [Castille] was a marked departure from the
approach in Williamson, which effectively sent the message . . . [that] judges should not
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Tesla Motors, Inc., filed a complaint in the Western District of Michigan for
declaratory and injunctive relief against Ruth Johnson (Secretary of State and
Chief Motor Vehicle Administrator), Bill Schuette (Attorney General), and
Rick Snyder (Governor).13 Tesla is now seeking constitutional relief from
Michigan’s dealer statute that categorically bans direct-to-consumer sales.14
In accordance with Maron’s earlier statements, Tesla is claiming a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 If courts’
applications of substantive due process are actually changing, then Tesla may
have a chance of persuading courts to invalidate statutes banning direct-toconsumer sales.
This Note, by analyzing the likelihood of Tesla’s success, examines
substantive due process jurisprudence, a field that, until recently, was well
settled. Specifically, this Note attempts to show that Tesla’s claim against
the State of Michigan presses for the evolution of substantive due process
and presents courts with an opportunity to reassess the doctrine, which circuit
courts have experimented with in recent years. Ultimately,
this
Note
explores the possibility that states such as Michigan have dealer statutes
banning direct-to-consumer sales as a direct result of political lobbying,
which, alone, may not be a sufficient legal basis for impinging on car
manufacturers’ rights. Part I addresses courts’ application of substantive due
process from the age of Lochner, through the post-New Deal era, and into the
modern era. Next, Part II outlines the scope of regulation of the automotive
industry and examines the viability of Tesla’s direct-sales model. Lastly, Part
III assesses the challenges that Tesla would face in persuading the U.S.
Supreme Court to strike down Michigan’s dealer law, and others like it that
prohibit direct sales, on the basis of substantive due process.
I. WAS IT THE GHOST OF LOCHNER LURKING,
OR A MERE [LEE] OPTICAL ILLUSION?
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits states from
depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”16 In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court understood this
Amendment to “extend to the citizens and residents of the States the same
protection against arbitrary state legislation, affecting life, liberty and
property, as is offered by the Fifth Amendment against similar legislation by
Congress.”17 The Court also recognized that states had designated “police
powers,” used to govern the “safety, health, morals and general welfare of
the public” that the Fourteenth Amendment does not affect.18 In the late
invoke the Due Process Clauses to second-guess legislative judgements that interfere with
economic liberty.”).
13. See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Tesla Motors, Inc. v.
Johnson, No. 16 Civ. 01158 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Tesla Complaint], 2016
WL 5346201.
14. Id. paras. 51–52; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1574 (2017).
15. Tesla Complaint, supra note 13, para. 52.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325 (1903).
18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these police powers allowed states
to restrict rights relating to alcohol,19 sanitation,20 property safety,21 and the
like. Part I.A highlights the period of the late nineteenth century to the 1930s,
when the Court would frequently intervene in legislation that it found to be
an unnecessary intrusion on citizens’ rights. Part I.B chronicles the period
from the 1930s onward, when the courts began to defer to legislative
judgment where neither fundamental rights nor protected classes were
implicated. Part I.C studies recent lower court decisions that exhibit a more
probing review of legislative decisions despite the otherwise deferential
regime.
A. Substantive Due Process:
Late 19th Century to the 1930s
In Lochner v. New York,22 the Court struck down a state statute that
impermissibly abrogated the freedom to contract conferred on individuals by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 New York State
passed legislation limiting the maximum weekly hours of bakery workers to
sixty and the maximum daily hours to ten.24 New York argued that the
regulation was a valid exercise of its police powers as it regulated the health
of both bakery workers and customers.25 While recognizing that a state
legislates permissibly where it is exercising its police power, the Supreme
Court held that the State of New York had gone beyond its police power by
opening up nondangerous industries to the state’s “all-pervading power.”26
The test became whether the statute was “a fair, reasonable and appropriate
exercise of the police power of the State, or [whether] it [was] an
unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the
individual to his personal liberty.”27
Although an earlier indication of the Constitution’s protection of liberty to
contract was present in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,28 Lochner was viewed as
regressive in the face of the increasingly dangerous conditions of industrial
19. See Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890) (“The police power of the State
is fully competent to regulate [the sale of liquor] to mitigate its evils or to suppress it
entirely.”).
20. See generally Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884) (allowing the city of San
Francisco to require hopeful laundromat operators to conform to certain sanitary guidelines).
21. See generally Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885) (allowing the state of
Missouri to require railroad operators to erect and maintain fences along the sides of the
tracks).
22. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
23. Id. at 64.
24. Id. at 46 n.1.
25. Id. at 58–60.
26. Id. at 59 (claiming that the trade of baking was no more dangerous than any other
trade).
27. Id. at 56. Statutes fitting the latter description were, in the Court’s view, “mere
meddlesome interferences” with the rights of “grown and intelligent men.” Id. at 61.
28. 165 U.S. 578 (1897); id. at 589 (“The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth]
[A]mendment means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint
of his person . . . but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen . . . to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential . . . .”).
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workplaces.29 Today, Supreme Court Justices still refer to Lochner as an
“anti-canon” of due process jurisprudence, an example of “judges usurping
legislative authority by basing decisions on policy preferences rather than
law.”30 Regardless of the judgment exercised by the Justices as to whether
regulating the working hours of bakers was actually within the state’s police
power, it was also important that the state provide scientific reasoning to
justify the law that the Court found insufficient “to justify the claimed right
of such interference.’”31
B. Substantive Due Process:
1930s to Present
Judicial intervention on statutes that, in the Court’s opinion, unjustifiably
exceeded the state’s police power continued as precedent until the late 1930s.
Occasionally, courts would uphold economic regulations so long as the
statute was not “arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the
policy the legislature is free to adopt.”32 Actual precedential change came
by way of the Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.33 The
Court held that the state legislature, in working to protect the interests of
women in the workplace, had the right to consider which means best
furthered such an interest, even where “the wisdom of the policy [would] be
regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain.”34 This reasoning informed
federal courts’ application of the Due Process Clause to economic regulations
throughout the twentieth century.35 This rational basis review has resulted in
the retention of state statutes that, so long as they only abrogate economic
rights, might be unfair or unwise.36
Commentators such as Bernard Siegan attribute the ruling in West Coast
Hotel to President Roosevelt’s attempt to “pack” the Court and the resulting
“switch in time that saved nine.”37 Justice Owen Roberts, who had voted to
strike down a state law regulating employment contracts one year prior to the

29. Its most fervent critics included Theodore Roosevelt and Justice Felix Frankfurter.
Colby & Smith, supra note 12, at 534–36.
30. Id. at 536 (quoting Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B.U. L. REV 859,
861 (2005)).
31. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62.
32. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934); see also BERNARD H. SIEGAN,
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 107 (2d ed. 2006) (finding that of the fifty-six
times that the Court struck down economic regulations between 1890 and 1936, fifteen were
decided based on freedom of contract).
33. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
34. Id. at 399 (invalidating a state statute imposing a minimum wage for women and
children).
35. See Austin Raynor, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99
VA. L. REV. 1065, 1069–70 (2013).
36. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[T]he existence
of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for [economic regulation] is not
to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis . . . .”).
37. SIEGAN, supra note 32, at 114.
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decision38 in West Coast Hotel, was the deciding vote.39 The famous
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.40 is also illuminating
here. Just one year after the decision in West Coast Hotel, the Court drew
the distinction that the Fourteenth Amendment does not call for exacting
scrutiny where the statute does not abridge fundamental rights41 or affect a
protected class.42
Perhaps the most drastic application of the rational basis analysis of
economic regulation came in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.43 The Court
upheld a state statute that prohibited an optician from fitting lenses into new
frames or duplicating existing lenses without a prescription from an
ophthalmologist or optometrist.44 Despite the Court’s admission that the
statute may place a “needless, wasteful” burden on opticians and customers,
it was “for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of the new requirement.”45 The Court also used post hoc
rationales to justify the statute without scrutiny.46
C. Substantive Due Process:
The Court’s Deference to Deference
The bad taste that Lochner left in the mouths of liberal and conservative
Justices alike kept the Court from intervening in the legislature’s sphere when
only economic rights were concerned.47 To be sure, this Note does not
advocate for a revival of Lochner. Starting in the 1980s, though, some
scholars called for the courts to recognize some legitimate judicial
intervention in state actions that abridge economic rights.48 Richard Epstein
argued that the Contracts Clause “extends substantial protection to economic
liberties against legislative . . . interference” and that courts should recognize
only limited state control over economic activities.49

38. See generally Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
39. SIEGAN, supra note 32, at 114.
40. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
41. This included restrictions “upon the right to vote, on restraints upon the dissemination
of information, on interferences with political organizations, as to prohibition of peaceable
assembly,” and on rights granted by the first ten Amendments. Id. at 153 n.4 (citations
omitted).
42. This protected class included “particular religious, or national, or racial minorities”
and other “discrete and insular minorities.” Id. (citations omitted).
43. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
44. Id. at 486.
45. Id. at 487.
46. Id. at 491 (“[I]t may be deemed important . . . that the eye doctor be restricted to
geographical locations that reduce the temptations of commercialism.” (emphasis added)).
47. Conservative judges believed that protection of nonenumerated rights was
“unjustifiable judicial activism,” while liberals decried the protection of the wrong rights and
suppression of the important and justiciable rights. Colby & Smith, supra note 12, at 556–61.
48. Bernard Siegan and Richard Epstein, for instance, separately argued that the Court
had essentially abdicated its duty to the people to check the legislature’s potential for abuses.
Id. at 564–65.
49. Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 703, 705 (1984).

1440

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

Regardless, state statutes that do not implicate fundamental rights or
protected classes are given a “‘strong presumption of validity’ under rational
basis review.”50 That review requires “only that the regulation bear some
rational relation to a legitimate state interest.”51 The state earns this
deference by offering merely “the government’s ‘rational speculation’
linking the regulation to a legitimate purpose, even ‘unsupported by evidence
or empirical data.’”52 Although there is no exhaustive list of legitimate
purposes for the sake of due process review, consumer protection is
recognized to be a legitimate purpose.53
In Castille, the Fifth Circuit struck down an economic regulation despite
applying rational basis review.54 A group of Benedictine monks were
enjoined from producing and selling caskets in accordance with a state law
limiting casket sales to funeral homes.55 The court concluded, “plaintiffs
may . . . negate a seemingly plausible basis for the law by adducing evidence
of irrationality.”56 It found that the funeral board’s proffered state interest of
“restrict[ing] predatory sales practices by third-party sellers” and of general
promotion of health and safety was “betrayed by the undisputed facts.”57
This, rather obviously, is a dramatic departure from the blind deference
exhibited by the Supreme Court in Lee Optical Co.
The Fifth Circuit relied in part on the Sixth Circuit’s assertion in
Craigmiles v. Giles58 that economic protectionism is not a legitimate state
interest for the purposes of due process analysis.59 Craigmiles involved a
challenge to a Tennessee law requiring casket sellers to be licensed by the
state as funeral directors.60 There, the Sixth Circuit opined that “[e]ven
foolish and misdirected provisions are generally valid if subject only to
rational basis review,”61 but “protecting a discrete interest group from
economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose.”62

50. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Walker v. Bain, 257
F.3d 660, 668 (6th Cir. 2001)).
51. Id. at 223.
52. Id. at 224 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).
53. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978) (ruling that protection
of the public from “vexatious” solicitation is a legitimate state interest for the purposes of
rational basis review).
54. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 225 (5th Cir. 2013).
55. Id. at 218.
56. Id. at 223.
57. Id.
58. 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
59. Castille, 712 F.3d at 222–23 (“[E]conomic protection, that is favoritism, may well be
supported by a post hoc perceived rationale as in Williamson—without which it is aptly
described as a naked transfer of wealth.” (emphasis added)). The Fifth Circuit first adopted
this reasoning in Greater Hous. Small Taxicab Co. v. City of Houston, 660 F.3d 235, 240 (5th
Cir. 2011).
60. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222.
61. Id. at 223–24.
62. Id. at 224.
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The Ninth Circuit shares this view.63 Even though the state of Tennessee
offered the justifications of public health, safety, and consumer protection,
the court found that there existed “no rational relationship to any of the
articulated purposes of the state,” leading it to conclude that the state was
merely protecting licensed funeral directors from competition.64 The Second
and Tenth Circuits, however, have ruled that economic protection is a
legitimate stand-alone purpose for the sake of rational basis review.65 The
Supreme Court has yet to address this issue, so the circuits remain split.66
It is important to note that Castille and Craigmiles are not revivals of
Lochner; rather, they are reinterpretations of substantive due process review
in the post-Lochner landscape. While the Lochner Court substituted the
legislature’s interpretation of the bounds of its police powers for its own, the
Castille and Craigmiles courts examined whether the states’ justifications for
their laws were legitimate at face value and, if so, whether such bases were
stated in good faith. This can be thought of as a two-step inquiry into whether
a state’s justifications for abridging rights deserve deference under rational
basis review: (1) whether the justification is legitimate and, if so, (2) whether
the justification is directly contravened by facts indicating that the
justification was made in bad faith.
The first part of the inquiry, for the purposes of this Note, largely hinges
on the resolution of the circuit split on economic protectionism.67 The second
part of the inquiry is murkier, but the Castille and Craigmiles courts clearly
exercise the authority to examine whether the state’s justifications are
directly contravened by the available evidence.
This was a new take on how to apply substantive due process analysis to
economic regulation. Not new, though, is the idea that rational basis review
can require a more probing inquiry into the adequacy of a state’s
justifications. The landmark case City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center68 struck down a state statute even though the allegedly discriminatory
law did not target a protected class.69 The state action at issue was a denial
of a zoning permit for the operation of a group home (referred to in the
opinion as “201 Featherston”) for the intellectually disabled.70 Not only did
the Supreme Court explicitly rule that intellectual disability does not
constitute “a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard
63. See Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a licensing
statute exempting licensure for certain animals but not others fails the rational basis test by
“singling out . . . three types of vertebrate pests” to “favor economically certain constituents
at the expense of others similarly situated”).
64. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228.
65. See Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 2015) (“We join
the Tenth Circuit and conclude that economic favoritism is rational for purposes of our review
of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1222
(10th Cir. 2004) (“[I]ntra-state economic protectionism . . . is a legitimate state interest . . . .”).
66. Jarod M. Bona & Luke A. Wake, The Market-Participant Exception to State-Action
Immunity from Antitrust Liability, COMPETITION, Fall 2014, at 156, 176 n.140.
67. Id.
68. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
69. See id. at 442, 450.
70. See id. at 435.

1442

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social
legislation,”71 but it also spent several pages explaining why the five
justifications provided by the city council were irrational.72 One district court
viewed this case as a “departure from the extreme deference accorded
legislative bodies in the past” and noted that “it is clear that a court would be
shrinking from its most basic duty if it abstained from both an analysis of the
legislation’s articulated objective and the method that the legislature
employed to achieve that objective.”73
The Supreme Court is well versed in scrutinizing government justifications
for discriminatory statutes. In questions of Commerce Clause violations, for
example, the Court requires the state to prove that discrimination in a law is
“demonstrably justified.”74 Leaving the burden to the legislatures, however,
does not preclude the Court from scrutinizing the proffered rationales and
disproving them. In Granholm v. Heald75 the Court faced a consolidated
challenge to New York and Michigan laws banning direct-to-consumer sales
of out-of-state wine.76 As one of the justifications provided for the ban, the
states argued that direct shipment of out-of-state wine would make it difficult
for the states to prevent underage drinking.77 The Court found that “[t]he
States provide little evidence that the purchase of wine over the Internet by
minors is a problem.”78 Though this would likely have been sufficient to
discredit the states’ justification under the Commerce Clause analysis,79 the
Court proceeded to review a study by the FTC that provided evidence
contrary to the states’ claim.80
While the Supreme Court is not completely reluctant to consider new
standards of scrutiny, it does voice concerns about straying from the mold.
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,81 for instance, the Court doubted the
judiciary’s ability to adequately review the purposes for which states pass
71. Id. at 442.
72. First, “mere negative attitudes, or fear, . . . are not permissible bases for treating a
home for the [intellectually disabled] differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings,
and the like,” id. at 448; second, “denying a permit based on such vague, undifferentiated fears
is again permitting some portion of the community to validate what would otherwise be an
equal protection violation, ” id. at 449; third, the concern of the home being built on a flood
plain “can hardly be based on a distinction between the Featherston home and, for example,
nursing homes,” id.; fourth, the “record does not clarify how . . . the characteristics of the
intended occupants . . . justify denying to those occupants what would be permitted to groups
occupying the same site for different purposes,” id. at 450; and fifth, “the expressed
worry . . . fail[s] rationally to justify singling out a home such as 201 Featherston for the
special use permit, yet imposing no such restrictions on the many other uses freely permitted
in the neighborhood,” id.
73. Brown v. Barry, 710 F. Supp. 352, 355 (D.D.C. 1989).
74. Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 (1992).
75. 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
76. Id. at 465.
77. Id. at 489.
78. Id. at 490.
79. See id. (“Under our [Commerce Clause] precedents, which require the ‘clearest
showing’ to justify discriminatory state regulation, this is not enough.” (quoting C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994))).
80. Id.
81. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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legislation.82 In disregarding the plaintiff’s demand for a heightened scrutiny
requiring legislation to “substantially advance” a legitimate state interest, the
Court ruled that such a test “would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of
a vast array of state and federal regulations” and might “empower . . . courts
to substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and
expert agencies”—an endeavor the Court found itself to be “not well suited”
to.83
The opinion in Lingle begs a broader question: is the legislature actually
best suited to review its own actions for evidence of abuse? Richard Epstein
argues that the state commits error in the forms of over- and underinclusion.84 He goes on to say that rational basis review sets a court’s “thumb
too heavily on the side of state power,” thus precluding “any serious review
of the fit between means and ends.”85 The solution, according to Epstein, is
to apply an intermediate review where “the court should defer where it
believes that a legislative decision is likely to be more accurate than its own,
or more precisely, where it believes the additional costs of its own extended
supervision . . . is not justified by an incremental improvement in fitting
means to ends.”86
II. FOSTERING FRANCHISES—DEALING DEALERS A LEG UP
After the first car dealerships emerged in the last decade of the nineteenth
century, cars were sold both directly by the manufacturers and indirectly by
the franchised and licensed dealerships.87 It was not until the mid-1920s that
the “emphasis in the industry [shifted] from production to distribution,”
which resulted in manufacturers acting more like wholesalers and leaving the
sales to dealerships.88 The relationship between manufacturers and
dealerships most resembles a traditional franchise, where the manufacturer
acts as a franchisor that sells finished products to its dealers, or franchisees,
who then put the products on the market for general consumption.89 As of
2010, there were 18,607 car dealerships in the United States, reflecting a

82. Id. at 544.
83. Id.
84. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 127–28 (1985).
85. Id. at 128.
86. Id. at 129; see also Bona & Wake, supra note 66, at 176 n.140 (“Intermediate scrutiny
might be more appropriate in order to deter self-interested regulatory conduct, on the
assumption that such conduct cannot enjoy the same presumption of legitimacy.”).
87. Francine Lafontaine & Fiona Scott Morton, State Franchise Laws, Dealer
Terminations, and the Auto Crisis, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2010, at 233, 234–35.
88. Id. at 235.
89. Traditional franchising contrasts with business-format franchising, where the
franchisor sells a brand, business model, and resources to a franchisee, who then produces and
sells a finished product to consumers. Id. at 237. Classic examples of this business-format
franchising model include fast-food chains and rental-car businesses. Id.
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steady decline since 2003.90 Despite that decline, car dealerships are doing
well; in 2014, car dealership net profits were higher than ever.91
This Part explores the industry of automobile sales and the regulatory
climate in which it exists. Part II.A discusses how and why most state dealer
statutes were passed. Part II.B addresses the history and the present form of
the new car sales industry. Part II.C weighs the advantages and
disadvantages of a direct-to-consumer sales model. Part II.D reviews the
statute at issue in Tesla. Lastly, Part II.E outlines past attempts to strike down
state dealer laws on constitutional grounds.
A. State Dealer Statutes:
Why Were They Passed?
In 1956, Congress passed the Automobile Dealer’s Day in Court Act
(ADDICA), which was formally called the Federal Automobile Dealer’s
Franchise Act.92 This statute requires car manufacturers to act in good faith
in their dealings with franchisees or else risk statutory damages.93 While
twenty states had their own franchise regulation statutes prior to ADDICA’s
enactment, all fifty states have one today; most of them are more dealer
friendly than ADDICA itself.94 Many states prohibit manufacturers from
terminating dealership relationships absent “good cause,” require them to
“demonstrate ‘need’ to establish a new dealership in a[n existing] dealer’s
‘Relevant Market Area,’” and require them to buy back unsold vehicles upon
termination of a franchise contract.95
Although ADDICA never so required, many of the subsequent state dealer
statutes included provisions that prevented manufacturers from selling cars
directly to consumers.96 Such statutes do not always prohibit direct sales
explicitly, but they at least prohibit manufacturers from having ownership

90. See id. at 236.
91. Phil LeBeau, Auto Dealers Racked Up Record Profits in 2014, CNBC (Apr. 10, 2015),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/10/auto-dealers-racked-up-record-profits-in-2014.html
[https://perma.cc/T7GV-LQGC].
92. Pub. L. No. 84-1026, 70 Stat. 125 (1956) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1225
(2012)); see Lafontaine & Morton, supra note 87, at 239.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1222.
94. See Lafontaine & Morton, supra note 87, at 239. See generally Carla Wong
McMillian, What Will It Take to Get You in a New Car Today?: A Proposal for a New Federal
Automobile Dealer Act, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 67 (2009) (proposing a new federal law that would
not only replace ADDICA but would preempt state dealership regulation). McMillian argues
that state dealer acts, as they stand, “have essentially supplanted the dealer agreement to define
the terms of the manufacturer-dealer relationship.” Id. at 73. She goes on to assert that a new
federal act could allow franchisors and franchisees to contract efficiently while still protecting
their interests. Id. at 101–03.
95. Lafontaine & Morton, supra note 87, at 234–41. For an example of a statutory
“relevant market area,” see WASH. REV. CODE § 46.96.140(1)(a)–(c) (1994).
96. See John T. Delacourt, New Cars and Old Laws: An Examination of Anticompetitive
Regulatory Barriers to Internet Auto Sales, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 155, 167 (2007).
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stakes in their franchisee dealerships.97 Other dealer statutes, like
Michigan’s, ban direct-to-consumer sales more explicitly.98
B. State Dealer Statutes:
Who Do They Protect?
Today, new-car-dealership profits are higher than ever,99 but they do not
derive much of those profits from the sale of new cars.100 Most dealerships
make their money primarily from reimbursements for repairs and from usedcar sales.101 While dealerships have benefitted from the protectionist
climate,102 many scholars and economists believe that this protection—
specifically, bans on direct-to-consumer sales—ultimately results in losses to
consumers.103 In a letter referencing the statute that Tesla now challenges,
the FTC cited similar studies and urged “the legislature to consider
abandoning the direct sales prohibition in Michigan’s existing law, and
instead permit manufacturers and consumers to reengage the normal

97. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 463(2) (McKinney 2017) (noting that “[i]t shall
be unlawful for any franchisor, not withstanding the terms of any franchise contract . . . to
acquire any interest in any additional motor vehicle dealer in this state,” excepting where the
interest is only temporary).
98. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1574 (2017) (“A manufacturer shall not . . .
[d]irectly or indirectly own, operate, or control a new motor vehicle dealer, including, but not
limited to, a new motor vehicle dealer engaged primarily in performing warranty repair
services on motor vehicles under the manufacturer’s warranty, or a used motor vehicle
dealer.”).
99. See LeBeau, supra note 91.
100. In 2015, the average net loss per new vehicle retailed was $22. STEVEN SZAKALY &
PATRICK MANZI, NADA DATA 2015: ANNUAL FINANCIAL PROFILE OF AMERICA’S
FRANCHISED NEW-CAR DEALERSHIPS 2 (2015), https://www.nada.org/WorkArea/
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=21474839497 [https://perma.cc/8QMR-7VH4].
101. Service, parts, and body-shop departments made, on average, 59.4 percent of the total
average gross income in 2015, and 17.6 percent of that figure was warranty work. Id. at 3.
Although the NADA does not separate financing profit from new-car sales profit, financing
and insurance make up a significant portion of that figure. Moneytips.com, How Car
Dealerships Really Make Their Money, BDN ME. (Aug. 5, 2015, 5:33 PM),
http://bangordailynews.com/2015/08/05/business/how-car-dealerships-really-make-theirmoney [https://perma.cc/426L-M4N8]. In 2015, the average retail net profit per used car sold
was $132 versus $22 lost on each new car sold. See SZAKALY & MANZI, supra note 100, at 2–
3.
102. See Moneytips.com, supra note 101 (citing auto sales growth for five uninterrupted
years at an average growth rate of 9 percent); see also Eric D. Stolze, A Billion Dollar
Franchise Fee? Tesla Motors’ Battle for Direct Sales: State Dealer Franchise Law and
Politics, 34 FRANCHISE L.J. 293, 306 (“Today, the country’s largest automotive dealer is a
publicly traded company, operating ‘265 dealerships in 15 states selling 32 different brands,’
with a total market capitalization exceeding $7 billion.” (quoting Peter Valdes-Dapena,
AutoNation to Become McDonald’s of Car Dealers, CNN (Jan. 31, 2013),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/31/autos/autonation-car-dealerships [https://perma.cc/R8TBJJUW])).
103. John Delacourt includes restrictions on manufacturers’ ability to advertise, issue
referral fees, broker financing, and sell cars or ancillary services as hindrances to efficiency
and innovation in car sales. Delacourt, supra note 96, at 164–68. He refers to bans on directto-consumer sales as “[p]erhaps the most universal, and fundamental, restriction imposed by
automotive franchise law,” as it “prevent[s] manufacturers from actively taking the same,
retail-level financial risks that [state dealer laws] supposedly impos[e] on dealers.” Id. at 167.
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competitive process that prevails in most other industries.”104 In its letter,
the FTC characterized the statute as offering “protectionism for independent
franchised dealers, to the detriment of Michigan car buyers.”105
The International Center for Law and Economics (ICLE) also weighed in
on this issue when Tesla was battling with the New Jersey legislature.106 The
ICLE characterized New Jersey’s ban on direct sales as an unjustified
“restraint of commerce.”107 It went on to say that the regulation serves to
“reduce competition in New Jersey’s automobile market for the benefit of its
auto dealers and to the detriment of its consumers.”108 To justify this
conclusion, the ICLE argued that dealers and manufacturers have the same
ability to exploit their full market power through price markups but that
eliminating independent dealer distribution incentivizes the use of the most
efficient model.109 Others argue that state laws regulating the manufacturerdealer relationship have led to an “over-dealered market,” which, in turn, has
contributed to the failure, and subsequent bailout, of the “Big Three”
American car companies.110
There are some, however, who contend that the franchised-dealer model is
better for consumers and competition alike. The NADA argues that such
laws protect the interests of smaller car dealerships and consumers by forcing
local dealers to compete with one another, while still protecting them from
the market whims of big manufacturers that could, absent such regulation,
open up multiple dealerships next to one another and saturate local
markets.111 The NADA also argues that manufacturers benefit from being
spared the burden of selling their own cars because, historically, they have
“failed miserably” in their attempts to enter the retail business.112 The
NADA’s tendency to support statutes banning direct-to-consumer sales
should not come as a surprise.

104. U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 6, at 11.
105. Id. at 1.
106. Letter from Int’l Ctr. for Law & Econ. to Chris Christie, Governor of N.J. (Mar. 26,
2014), https://law.wm.edu/documents/Tesla_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W2V-RAEG]; see
also Hunter Walker, Tesla Goes to War Against Chris Christie, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2014,
12:25
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-motors-vs-chris-christie-2014-3
[https://perma.cc/33X4-L8VQ].
107. Id. at 1.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 3 (arguing that neither the ICLE nor the Motor Vehicle Commission are well
suited to comment on which system is best for consumers).
110. McMillian, supra note 94, at 68; see also Kate Linebaugh, The Trials of the Auto
Dealer, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122969965719421799
[https://perma.cc/NK3N-JKHV].
111. See generally Why Dealer Franchise Laws?, NADA, https://www.nada.org/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=21474838847 [https://perma.cc/X8ZS-FRLC] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2017).
112. Auto Retailing:
Why the Franchise System Works Best, NADA 1,
https://www.nada.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=21474838843
[https://perma.cc/8BHT-ZJ8Z] (arguing that retailing requires skills better suited to
individually owned dealerships and that small businesses are better positioned to incur the
inherent costs of business).
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Some major car manufacturers, General Motors (GM) for example, have
also supported retail regulation. In response to a proposed bill allowing Tesla
to circumvent Ohio’s ban of direct-to-consumer sales, GM wrote a letter
addressed to Governor John Kasich arguing that allowing Tesla to eschew
the dealership-franchise model would amount to unfair competition.113 GM
also made an official statement in support of the bill that amended Michigan’s
dealer statute that Tesla now challenges.114
While it may be counterintuitive that a major car manufacturer would
support legislation that imposes more regulations on the production and
distribution of automobiles, GM has its own horse in the electric-car race.
Chevrolet, a subsidiary of GM, released the all-new Bolt EV for 2017.115
Prior to its introduction of the Bolt, electric-car buyers had only one model
to choose from if they needed a battery range of anything beyond 150 miles:
the Tesla Model S.116 The Bolt, with its 238 miles of range, as rated by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is the only electric car to challenge
Tesla’s range supremacy.117
C. Does the Direct-to-Consumer Sales Model Make Sense?
The FTC hosted Todd Maron, Tesla’s General Counsel, at a conference
entitled “Auto Distribution: Current Issues & Future Trends” in January
2016.118 Maron outlined seven reasons why a traditional franchisedealership system would not be viable for Tesla: (1) dealership locations,119

113. See Eric Loveday, General Motors Sends Anti-Tesla Direct Sales Letter to Ohio
Governor, INSIDEEVS (Mar. 24, 2014), http://insideevs.com/general-motors-sends-anti-teslaletter-ohio-governor [https://perma.cc/FF8F-EYRZ].
114. See Damon Lavrinc, General Motors Supports Anti-Tesla Motors Bill in Michigan,
JALOPNIK (Oct. 21, 2014, 12:18 PM) http://jalopnik.com/general-motors-supports-anti-teslabill-in-michi-1648915169 [https://perma.cc/B36P-452F] (“We believe that House Bill 5606
will help ensure that all automotive manufacturers follow the same rules to operate in the State
of Michigan; therefore, we encourage Governor Snyder to sign it.”). Michigan House Bill
5606 became section 445.1574 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 445.1574 (2017).
115. Chevrolet Bolt EV, CHEVROLET, http://media.chevrolet.com/media/us/en/
chevrolet/vehicles/bolt-ev/2017.html [https://perma.cc/8UL9-VYGY] (last visited Nov. 19,
2017).
116. A base Tesla Model S is rated by the EPA to have 218 miles of electric range, while
the next highest range of 114 miles was found in the BMW i3. Joseph Capparella, Home on
the Range: 2017 Chevrolet Bolt EPA Rated at 238 Miles of Range, CAR & DRIVER (Sept. 13,
2016, 12:01 AM) http://blog.caranddriver.com/2017-chevy-bolt-ev-epa-rated-at-238-milesof-range [https://perma.cc/56QF-MRVK].
117. Id.
118. Matt Pressman, Tesla Defends Direct Sales Model at FTC Talks; Cites Unfair
Opposition from GM, EVANNEX (Jan. 23, 2016) https://evannex.com/blogs/news/74602181tesla-defends-direct-sales-model-at-ftc-talks-cites-unfair-opposition-from-gm
[https://perma.cc/UJZ7-6ZV6].
119. Id. (explaining that Teslas utilize technology new and foreign enough to necessitate
locations in high foot-traffic areas rather than the “out-of-the-way” locations of traditional car
dealerships).
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(2) inventory differences,120 (3) longer sales cycles,121 (4) different profit
models,122 (5) no advertising,123 (6) dealer price markups,124 and (7) conflicts
of interest.125 While this Note does not detail every one of these reasons,
several of them are supported by the research outlined below.
In 2014, Consumer Reports endeavored to study the ability and willingness
of car dealers to sell their electric and hybrid inventory.126 Of the eighty-five
dealerships visited in the survey by “secret shoppers” inquiring about buying
a hybrid or electric car, thirty-five recommended buying a gas-powered car
instead, and thirteen discouraged the purchase of a hybrid or electric car
entirely.127 More to Maron’s point that a dealership cannot effectively sell
both gas-powered and electric cars, Consumer Reports found “a strong
correlation between the salesperson’s knowledge about electric cars and their
propensity to encourage people to buy them.”128 While Maron’s contention
that dealerships earn the bulk of their profits from service and parts is also
true,129 Consumer Reports found the 2015 Tesla Model S to have a “worsethan-average” problem rate, stemming mostly from problems with “the
drivetrain, power equipment, charging equipment, giant iPad-like center
console, and body and sunroof squeaks, rattles, and leaks.”130
The Trefis Team, a collection of Massachusetts Institute of Technology
engineers and Wall Street analysts,131 believe that based on the profit margins
of the Tesla Model S, the direct-sales model is critical for Tesla’s success.132
Trefis predicts that the gross profit margin for the Tesla Model S will be
approximately 27.5 percent, which will increase to 30 percent over the next
six years.133 If those margins were to steadily decline, however, there could

120. Id. (noting that Teslas are ordered custom from the factory, so dealerships would not
have inventory on-site).
121. Id. (speculating that Tesla customers would need more time with salespeople than
dealerships can traditionally provide).
122. Id. (claiming that, unlike dealerships, Tesla derives all of its profits from new-car sales
and none from parts, service, or financing).
123. Id. (noting that Tesla does not advertise).
124. Id. (positing that for a dealership to make a profit, it would need to sell Teslas at a
price marked up from the price available online or only in states that allow direct sales).
125. Id. (arguing that a dealership could not effectively sell internal combustion cars and
electric cars at the same time).
126. Eric Evarts, Dealers Not Always Plugged in About Electric Cars, Consumer Reports’
Study Reveals, CONSUMER REP. (Apr. 22, 2014, 8:00 AM) http://www.consumerreports.org/
cro/news/2014/04/dealers-not-always-plugged-in-about-electric-cars-secret-shopper-studyreveals/index.htm [https://perma.cc/3J2W-7MB5].
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra Part II.B.
130. Mark Rechtin, Tesla Reliability Doesn’t Match Its High Performance, CONSUMER
REP. (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.consumerreports.org/cars-tesla-reliability-doesnt-match-itshigh-performance [https://perma.cc/8KV9-FRHY].
131. Trefis Team Full Bio, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/
people/trefis/#319338154462 [https://perma.cc/EV9R-PRXC] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
132. Trefis Team, Is the Direct Sales Model Critical for Tesla Motors?, FORBES (Mar. 3,
2016, 8:40 AM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2016/03/03/is-the-directsales-model-critical-for-tesla-motors/#4706144f23b3 [https://perma.cc/4B9R-CCUW].
133. Id.
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be a substantial downside.134 Trefis believes that a dealership model would
cut too far into these margins without being able to “prove itself in the mass
market to enjoy economies of scale.”135 Furthermore, Tesla’s direct sales
model is likely to save consumers money. Thirty percent of an average new
vehicle’s price covers distribution costs, and allowing manufacturers to
distribute products themselves could save consumers between $1500 and
$2600 per new car sold.136
Daniel Crane highlights the electric automotive upstart Fisker Automotive,
whose failure is possibly attributable to its decision to pursue a franchise
distribution model rather than a direct distribution model.137 By deciding to
sell its cars through franchised dealerships, Fisker used existing dealer
networks that had also dedicated themselves to selling other manufacturers’
cars.138 While Fisker had myriad problems that likely contributed to its
failure139 and the car was sold for too short a time for there to be data as to
whether its distribution model was flawed,140 it is not hard to imagine the
difficulty in selling a brand-new, foreign electric car alongside gas-powered
cars made by manufacturers with household names. Kelley Blue Book
analyst Karl Brauer argues that, were the legislature to force Tesla to sell its
cars alongside conventional gas-powered cars, they could see their “image
and customer experience splinter into thousands of pieces,” which a new
entrant to the automobile market cannot afford.141
Despite the regulatory roadblocks, Tesla’s business model appears to be
attractive enough to have inspired at least one other automotive upstart to sell
directly. Lynk & Co, a newly formed carmaker spun off from China’s Geely,
is planning to sell cars through a combination of online order processing and
company-owned outlets.142 Believing that distribution costs contribute to 25
134. Trefis calculated a possible 15 percent loss if the margins were to sink to 25 percent.
Id.
135. Id.
136. Cynthia Barmore, Tesla Unplugged: Automobile Franchise Laws and the Threat to
the Electric Vehicle Market, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 185, 201 (2014).
137. Crane, supra note 4, at 581–82.
138. Id. at 581.
139. See generally Katie Fehrenbacher, A Look Under the Hood: Why Electric Car Startup
Fisker Crashed and Burned, GIGAOM (Apr. 17, 2013, 5:29 PM), https://gigaom.com/2013/04/
17/a-look-under-the-hood-why-electric-car-startup-fisker-crashed-and-burned
[https://perma.cc/LEZ9-VQZM] (citing problems such as regulatory delays, reliance on parts
suppliers, public relations problems, executive upheaval, and recalls for dangerously defective
parts).
140. Crane, supra note 4, at 581–82.
141. Brian Fung, Why Tesla Keeps Fighting for Direct Sales When It Could Just Work with
Dealers, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2014/10/22/why-tesla-keeps-fighting-for-direct-sales-when-it-could-just-workwith-dealers [https://perma.cc/YN2A-RX75].
142. Mike Duff, Lynk & Co Brand to Do Without Dealerships, Sell “Smartphones on
Wheels,” CAR & DRIVER (Oct. 24, 2016, 9:16 AM), http://blog.caranddriver.com/lynk-cobrand-to-do-without-dealerships-sell-smartphones-on-wheels
[https://perma.cc/E43HX8MN]. Alain Visser, senior vice president of Lynk & Co, noted, “We’re learning from what
Tesla has been doing there . . . . It’s not easy, and we know that because Tesla is a ‘home’
brand it has an advantage. . . . [A]t the end of the day—our model will create employment.”
Id.
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percent of a car’s price, Lynk & Co intends to pass these savings along to the
consumer.143 As of this writing, the company has not publicly addressed the
legal hurdles facing direct car sales.
Independent dealerships, though, do provide valuable services to
consumers.144 Dealers can provide maintenance services, regulatory services
relating to registration and titling, and social services ensuring that
customers’ cars are road ready.145 It is unknown whether Tesla-owned stores
could provide these services as effectively as independently owned dealers.
The NADA argues that the integration of manufacturing and distribution will
rob consumers of these safeguards.146 Others who believe that the dealership
model is effective include business mogul Warren Buffett, who explained,
“When a distribution system . . . becomes that firmly established, there’s a
reason for it.”147
D. The Michigan Amendment
In May 2014, the Michigan legislature introduced an amendment to
Michigan’s dealer franchise law. Michigan House Bill 5606148 was a
proposed amendment to Michigan’s dealer law that added to the list of
prohibitions on car manufacturers.149 Among the existing prohibitions was
subsection (i), which forbade carmakers from selling “any new motor vehicle
directly to a retail customer other than through its franchised dealers.”150
This particular subsection was left untouched until the legislature introduced
an amended bill on October 2, 2014. In this version of Michigan House Bill
5606, subsection (i) had the word “its” removed and provided that a
manufacturer could not “[s]ell any new motor vehicle directly to a retail
customer other than through franchised dealers.”151
The amendment was introduced by Republican Representative Aric
Nesbitt.152 Representative Nesbitt was the lead Republican staffer for the

143. Martin Gurdon, Geely Confirms Direct Sales for New Lynk & Co Brand,
MOTORTRADER (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.motortrader.com/motor-trader-news/automotivenews/geely-sell-lynk-co-cars-online-retail-stores-20-10-2016 [https://perma.cc/Q4CJ-45PE].
144. See Barmore, supra note 136, at 200.
145. See id. at 200–01.
146. See supra Part II.B.
147. Daron Gifford, Why Warren Buffett Is Wrong on Car-Dealer Model, CNBC (Apr. 9,
2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/09/why-warren-buffett-is-wrong-on-car-dealer-modelcommentary.html [https://perma.cc/Q2SP-SLPT]. Gifford also mentioned that one month
before his interview with Buffett, Buffett’s company, Berkshire Hathaway, acquired the
largest privately held dealership group in the United States. Id.
148. H.R. 5606, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (as introduced in Michigan House of Representatives
on May 28, 2014).
149. The bill would amend the statute to add that a manufacturer may not “ prevent, attempt
to prevent, prohibit, coerce, or attempt to coerce a new motor vehicle dealer from charging
any consumer any fee or charge allowed to be charged by the dealer under the laws of this
state.” H.R. 5606 (as introduced in Michigan House of Representatives on May 28, 2014).
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. H.R. 5606, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (as passed by Michigan Senate on Oct. 2, 2014).
152. Id.; see also 2014 Michigan Public Acts Table, LEGISLATIVE SERVICE BUREAU 36
(Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2013-2014/publicacttable/pdf/

2017]

THE ELECTRICS SLIDE

1451

Congressional Natural Gas Caucus and wrote the Natural Gas Subcommittee
Report on Energy and Job Creation,153 which highlights “the EPA’s
continued assault on fossil fuels.”154 Although Representative Nesbitt is
listed as the legislator who introduced the amendment, Tesla Motors posted
on its blog that it was Republican Senator Joe Hune who struck the word “its”
from the amendment.155 The National Institute on Money in State Politics
found that the Michigan Auto Dealers Association (MADA) contributed over
$15,000 to Senator Hune’s campaign efforts; its contribution during the 2014
election cycle was the biggest yet.156
After the amendment passed, GM issued a public statement applauding the
State of Michigan for banning direct sales of automobiles.157 The company
stated that the bill “will provide stability and support for our dealers” and will
“ensure we compete under the same rules in the marketplace as other
automobile manufacturers.”158
E. Previous Attempts to Strike Down Dealer Statutes
While some lower courts have applied standards of review requiring more
scrutiny, no lower court has struck down a state dealer law on constitutional
grounds. In Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. Hull,159 a collection of
carmakers sued the state of Arizona on Commerce Clause and
anticompetitive grounds for amending its auto dealer statute160 to ban
manufacturers from selling ancillary services, such as parts, services,
accessories, or financing.161 The court found that the statute did not
impermissibly prevent manufacturers from indirectly competing because
existing franchise statutes already protected dealers from “competitive
business practices by the manufacturers.”162

2014-PAT.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP2R-44UJ] (indicating that House Bill 5606 was filed and
effected on October 21, 2014).
153. See generally STATE OF MICH. H.R. SUBCOMM. ON NAT’L GAS, REPORT ON ENERGY
AND JOB CREATION, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2012), http://banmichiganfracking.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/11/NaturalGasReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CRE7-L8MR].
154. Id. at 20.
155. The Tesla Motors Team, A Raw Deal in Michigan, TESLA (Oct. 16, 2014)
https://www.tesla.com/blog/raw-deal-michigan [https://perma.cc/8MHA-LSXH]. Tesla also
claimed that the version of the amendment striking the word “its” was introduced on “the last
day of the legislative session.” Id.
156. Contributions of Michigan Auto Dealers Association to Joe Hune,
FOLLOWTHEMONEY.ORG,
http://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?c-t-eid=1393809&deid=3185%23%5B%7B4%7C#[{1|gro=c-t-id,d-eid [https://perma.cc/CXU8-LEKC] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2017).
157. Press Release, Gen. Motors, Statement on GM Support of Michigan House Bill (Oct.
21, 2014), http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/
en/2014/Oct/1021-hb-5066.html [https://perma.cc/CQR6-VB4W].
158. Id.
159. 137 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Ariz. 2001).
160. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-4460 (2017).
161. All. of Auto. Mfrs., 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1168–69.
162. Id. at 1174. The court also asserted, without apparent support, that “[s]uch franchise
laws keep the disparity of power between manufacturers and dealers in check.” Id. at 1168.
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In Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Department of Transportation,163 Ford
claimed that a Texas statute that prohibited manufacturers from acting as car
dealers deprived Ford of equal protection and due process and sued to enjoin
the enforcement of the statute.164 Ford had developed a system where
customers could view preowned cars online and schedule test drives; Ford
would then deliver the car to a voluntarily participating dealer who could sell
the car on consignment.165 The court found that the state did not treat Ford
dissimilarly to other manufacturers, and, thus, that the enforcement was
constitutional.166
In International Truck & Engine Corp. v. Bray,167 International challenged
the enforcement of a Texas statute168 that applied to the sale of commercial
trucks for violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.169 International
argued that the statute treated in-state and out-of-state manufacturers
differently by creating an exception to the statute170 that allows a single
manufacturer of motorhomes to also act as a dealer, evidencing Texas’s
arbitrary, if not discriminatory, intent.171 The court found that the
legislature’s proffered interests in preventing unfair advantage to vertically
integrated companies were legitimate and that barring International from
acting as a dealer was a rational furtherance of these interests.172
Lastly, in Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. v. Currey,173 another
conglomeration of car manufacturers brought an antitrust and Contract
Clause action against the State of Connecticut over a 2009 amendment to the
Connecticut Franchise Act,174 which revised the proscribed method for
calculating dealer compensation for warranty work and barred manufacturers
from recouping costs incurred by such reimbursement provisions.175 The
court summarized the plaintiff’s argument as follows:
The provisions were actually motivated by a decrease in the volume of
warranty repairs; that the legislature deliberately sought to recapture lost
revenue; that the law insulates dealers from competition with independent
service shops; and that a growing body of literature undercuts “the wellworn rationale that all motor vehicle franchise laws, no matter how
oppressive, overreaching or economically devastating to manufacturers and

163. 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001).
164. Id. at 498.
165. See id. at 498–99.
166. Id. at 510–11. Ford pointed to a similar GM website that the court found permissible
under the statute, but the Court emphasized that a third-party dealer operated the GM website
and, thus, GM was not acting as a dealer through that contract. Id.
167. 372 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2004).
168. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2301.476(c) (West 2017).
169. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 372 F.3d at 724–25.
170. OCC. § 2301.476(h).
171. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 372 F.3d at 726–27.
172. Id. at 728.
173. 984 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D. Conn. 2013), aff’d, 610 F. App’x 10 (2d Cir. 2015).
174. Id. at 39–40.
175. Id. at 40.
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consumers, are necessary to protect dealers from abuses by manufacturers
or to level the playing field to equalize the parties’ bargaining power.”176

The court dismissed Alliance’s complaint, holding that Alliance failed to
allege facts sufficient to overcome the “strong presumption of legislative
rationality,” despite reference to a “body of literature” that undercut the
legislature’s justifications.177 The Second Circuit issued a nonprecedential
affirmation of the district court’s ruling.178
III. CAN TESLA TOPPLE THE TRADE-IN TITANS?
If Tesla’s case reaches the Supreme Court, Tesla has two substantial
hurdles to persuade the Court to rule in its favor. This Part addresses each
hurdle in turn. Part III.A explains that Tesla needs to show the Court why its
case is unlike every other constitutional challenge that has been brought
against dealer statutes. Part III.B then argues that Tesla needs to convince
the Court to adopt a more searching review of the legitimacy of the
government’s interests supporting the amendment, as well as the rationality
with which the legislature believes the amendment will further those
interests.
A. Why Tesla Is Different
Tesla’s case is different from the constitutional challenges outlined in Part
II.E. In each of those cases, the court reasoned that protecting the interests
of parties dissimilarly situated, such as dealers against manufacturers, does
not cause constitutional problems. In Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
v. Hull, the manufacturers claimed that the challenged statute granted dealers
a competitive edge over manufacturers.179 Likewise, in Ford Motor Co. v.
Texas Department of Transportation, Ford claimed that the statute gave an
unfair advantage to used-car dealers, not that it gave an unfair advantage to
some car manufacturers over others.180 In International Truck & Engine
Corp. v. Bray, the plaintiff claimed that one in-state dealer was given an
advantage, not that in-state manufacturers were generally treated
dissimilarly.181 Lastly, in Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. v.
Currey, the plaintiffs argued that the state was insulating dealers from
competition with independent car-service businesses.182
The unwritten common thread throughout these failed attempts to strike
down dealer statutes is that each plaintiff alleged that the statutes protected
the interests of parties that were not so similarly situated as to be a deprivation
of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. This translates best to the rationality
prong of a due process challenge because if a statute does not treat similarly
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 60 (quoting the plaintiff’s allegations in its complaint).
Id. at 60–61.
All. of Auto. Mfrs. v. Currey, 610 F. App’x 10, 11 (2d Cir. 2015).
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
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situated actors equally, then it should fail to meet the rational relation
requirement. Thus, as long as all manufacturers are affected equally, these
courts would not necessarily find a violation. In each of the cases above, the
dealer statutes affected all similarly situated parties equally.
Tesla’s argument is different. In its complaint, Tesla alleges that “the only
possible purpose [for the statute] is to protect two discrete Michigan-based
interest groups—Michigan’s franchised auto dealers and Michigan-based
manufacturers—from economic competition.”183 Tesla also claims that a
franchise model, as exercised by all other car manufacturers who sell cars in
the United States, would not be viable for either Tesla or the hypothetical
independent Tesla dealers.184 Tesla’s claim is unique from the other car
manufacturers’ claims because Tesla alleges that Michigan discriminates
against it relative to all other car manufacturers. Thus, the discrimination
arbitrarily affects parties that are similarly situated. Furthermore, because
there are no independent Tesla dealerships, the statute is not protecting any
dealership interests against Tesla as a manufacturer, so the rulings by the
courts in the previous four cases do not govern here.
Although subjected to the stricter scrutiny applied in Commerce Clause
cases, the Supreme Court’s consideration of state-proffered justifications in
Granholm v. Heald is more analogous here than the consideration given to
other car manufacturers’ claims against state dealer laws. Not only are the
underlying restrictions of rights similar in both cases,185 the sources of
evidence contradicting the states’ rationales are also similar.186
B. Stare Decisis
Even if the Court were to find that Tesla is different from those other car
manufacturers that have failed where Tesla hopes to succeed, the Supreme
Court would need to settle some thorny due process questions. In that event,
Tesla is well situated to force at least one of the two issues highlighted in Part
I.C. For instance, it can challenge the Court to solve the circuit split over the
legitimacy of economic protectionism as a state interest for purposes of due
process review, or it can try to convince the Court to apply a standard of
review that, though burgeoning, is not widespread. This means that the Court
would need to break with precedent and conduct a more searching
investigation into the proffered interests of the Michigan legislature in
passing the statute.

183. Tesla Complaint, supra note 13, para. 55.
184. Id. paras. 42–43.
185. In Tesla, the underlying restrictions are of direct-to-consumer sales of cars, see supra
note 14 and accompanying text, and in Granholm the underlying restrictions were of directto-consumer sales of wine, see supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
186. The FTC cited “[t]he vast majority of existing work by economists,” suggesting that
allowing companies to make the decision of whether to sell their products themselves results
in “better outcomes for consumers.” U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 6, at 5; see also
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466–68 (2005) (citing the FTC’s stance against restrictions
on direct sales of wine).
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In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,187 the Court opines that overruling
precedent requires the Court to consider whether the previous
rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability;
whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special
hardship to the consequences of overruling . . . ; whether related principles
of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a
remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed, or come
to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.188

This implicates two different strategies that the State of Michigan could use
in defending its law against Tesla. Michigan could argue that the sole
justification for abridging Tesla’s due process rights is economic protection
of a discrete group and that such a justification alone is legitimate for the
purposes of rational basis review. Alternatively, it could argue that the statute
serves other, more obviously legitimate purposes. In the first case, the Court
would only need to settle whether economic protectionism is a legitimate
state interest, which is a question the circuits have split on. In the second
case, the Court would be forced to decide whether state interests should be
taken at face value and, if not, how to test whether such an interest was
provided in good faith.
Therefore, if Tesla Motors Inc. v. Johnson reaches the Supreme Court, the
Court should abandon the rule of unquestioned deference to state legislatures’
judgment on questions of economic regulation and rule that economic
protectionism is not a legitimate state interest. The Court, when assessing
whether the Michigan law bears any rational relation to a legitimate state
interest, should not accept as “rational” the argument that barring direct-toconsumer sales of cars is a form of consumer protection from dangers such
as higher pricing, inadequate consumer services, or unsafe cars. It should be
suspicious of the political currency that Michigan earns by protecting dealers’
associations and GM from competition. It should reject “evidentiary”
findings relating to the benefits of the independent dealer-franchise system
that were published by an organization as self-interested as the NADA, and
it should credit only evidence produced by neutral evaluators and
organizations. If the Court applies this more searching inquiry into the
motivations and justifications of the state rather than the blind deference of
Lee Optical, it will inevitably find that the statute barring Tesla and others
from selling cars directly is related only to the state’s interest in protecting
the economic interests of major automobile manufacturers and car
dealerships. If the Court decides the circuit split in favor of those circuits
that have found economic protectionism not to be a legitimate state interest,
then Tesla may win its case.
The best argument for declaring economic protectionism an insufficient
justification for economic regulation is that, by allowing state governments
to statutorily grant protection to certain industry groups, the Court essentially
187. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
188. Id. at 854–55 (internal citations omitted).
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allows politicians to pick winners and losers, or, even worse, to put those
positions up for sale. New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson, for instance,
sees corruption as an inevitable consequence of legislatures’ attempts to
“bolster one industry, penalize another, or ‘stimulate’ one sort of economic
activity over another.”189 Even where industrial policy was born out of good
intentions, the economic effects of such protection are rarely calculated
properly by politicians.190 Assuming that industries needing economic
protection lobby governments for it and that governments need these
lobbying dollars, industry “losers get most of the protection because losers
lobby harder.”191 Often, these arguments are made in opposition to
governments’ investments in private companies so as to give one party an
advantage over others.192 What makes the protectionism practiced by the
Michigan legislature an even more compelling case for judicial action is that
it has given well-established economic players an advantage over one party—
a start-up no less.
In Nebbia v. New York,193 the Court found that “the Legislature is primarily
the judge of the necessity of [an economic] enactment, that every possible
presumption is in favor of its validity,” and that “the courts are both
incompetent and unauthorized to deal” in questioning that wisdom.194 The
Nebbia Court’s concern, however, is not implicated in Tesla. The judiciary
does not impinge on the domain of the legislature by preventing a “naked
attempt to raise a fortress protecting . . . monopoly rents”195 at the expense
of consumers.
When we consider the parameters laid out in Planned Parenthood for when
overturning precedent is appropriate, it seems clear that the political climate
has changed significantly to warrant such a ruling. The fourth justification
that Court provided, that the “facts have so changed or come to be seen so
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
The reaction to Lochner was an
justification,”196 fits well here.
understandable response to the apathetic cowboy-capitalists of the industrial
age. State legislatures were thus empowered to defend the rights of their
189. Gary Johnson, Government Picking Winners and Losers=Corruption, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-johnson/solyndra-corruption_
b_1022089.html [https://perma.cc/H5HF-85BF].
190. Picking
Winners,
Saving
Losers,
ECONOMIST
(Aug.
5,
2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/16741043 [https://perma.cc/2YKW-YN4T].
191. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying:
Why Governments Pick Losers 45 (London Sch. of Econ., Pol. Sci. & Pol. Econ. Working
Paper No. 3/2007, 2007), http://www.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/PSPE/
pdf/PSPE_WP3_07.pdf [https://perma.cc/73JW-M7VS].
192. See, e.g., Eric Lipton & John M. Broder, In Rush to Assist a Solar Company, U.S.
Missed
Signs,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
22,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/us/politics/in-rush-to-assist-solyndra-united-statesmissed-warning-signs.html [https://perma.cc/K324-QQRZ] (characterizing the Obama
administration’s failed backing of solar startup Solyndra as “one of the administration’s most
costly fumbles”).
193. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
194. Id. at 537–38.
195. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002).
196. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
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constituents against big money interests. The facts have changed in that those
same big money interests have bled into the legislative realm, and the
deferential standard has been “robbed . . . of significant application or
justification”197 in that, under the modern regime, the courts are the citizens’
last line of defense.
CONCLUSION
Gone are the days when any regulation served to promote the health and
wellness of the general population. In allowing special interests to creep into
politics, the Court has robbed itself of its ability to check the legislature for
abuses. The presumption that a state government has passed a law in
accordance with good judgment has no place in an arena where an innovative
business is barred from selling a product that is environmentally sustainable,
cheaper to the consumer, and easier to buy, simply because the local
Chrysler-Dodge-Kia dealership would rather not be forced to make car
buying competitively pleasant. The Texan from this Note’s Introduction
should be able to buy the car he wants from whom he wants, especially if
consumers, corporations, and the environment will be better off if he can.

197. Id.

